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DON R. KYNASTON
512 North 750 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH
-ooOooCITY OF BOUNTIFUL,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 900554-CA

DON R. KYNASTON,
Appellant.
ooOoo

Appeal, Petition for Review
This Appeal is taken from Bountiful Circuit Court, Bountiful, Utah, the
Honorable S. Mark Johnson presiding.
Agreement priority classification pursuant to Rule 29.
DATED this

^T"

day of

, 1991.

DOtf R7 KYNASTOIVTrYeemtn^
512 North 750 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Appellant

Russell Mahan
734 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Respondent
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
Section 78-2A-3d, Jurisdiction of Appeals
COMMON LAW ADAPTED
Section 68-3-1
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COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction,

including

jurisdiction

of

interlocutory appeals over (a) appeals from the Circuit Courts (e) appeals
from any Court of record in criminal cases.
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(Section 78-2A-3d)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Point #1:
case?

Did the Circuit Court have phenery jurisdiction to adjudicate this

After Kynaston, the Defendant, demanded that Bountiful City prove its

jurisdiction.
Point #2:

Did the Bountiful Circuit Court lawfully arraign and try Don R.

Kynaston without procedural due process.
Point #3:

Can the Bountiful City Prosecutor harass the Defendant and order

the Bountiful City Police to harass the Defendant?
Point #4:

Can the Trial Judge sentence the Defendant Don R. Kynaston to the

County Jail without defense counsel present?
Point #5:

Can a legislative creation such as the Department of Safety Drivers

License Division take away a person's driver's privilege or right to drive
without procedural due process as described in the 5th and 14th Amendments?
Point #6:

Under Common Law, can there be a crime if there is no intent, no

injury, no damage or negligence?
Point #7:

Is the Davis County Sheriff's Department responsible for the

hospital and medical bills incurred by a jailed inmate while that inmate is in
custody of the County Sheriff, because of poor jail conditions and following
brutal treatment?

.4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
4th Amendment:
ARTICLE IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, nouses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
5th Amendment:
ARTICLE V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
6th Amendment:
ARTICLE VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.
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Constitution of the United State, Cont.
14th Amendment:
ARTICLE XIV
Section I.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
In that connection, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1966,
provided in Rule 44(a):
DEFINITIONS:

p

See Addendum

amended in 1966, provide in Rule 44(a):

Personal Liberty

p

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, (1914) P. 1965
Procedural Due Process

p

5th Amendment, U.S. Constitution

p

5

14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution

p

6

Harassment, Title 18 15 U.S.C.A. Section 1514

p

15
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a criminal case, based on the allegations that the Appellant
alleged violated certain provisions of the Bountiful City Traffic Code 41-2136 and 41-6-117 and 41-6-150, civil statutes mysteriously now becoming a
crime, (a misdemeanor) and a criminal action.
The Appellant was stopped, arrested, and booked in the Davis County Jail
allegedly for failing

to appear

in Circuit

Court, Salt Lake City, for

allegedly driving under suspension of driver's license, having been suspended
in 1985.

Title 41, U.C.A.

Suspension

of Driving

(privilege) was done

unlawfully in violation of procedural due process, Clauses 5th Amendment, 14th
Amendment, U.S. Constitution.

Course of the Proceedings
The Appellant was stopped by a Bountiful City Police, Julie Wilcox, on
the evening of July 7, 1990 at approximately

1:45 p.m.

Wilcox used the

pretense that Kynaston appeared to be driving

under

influence.

the

In

reality, Kynaston was trying to avoid perceived potholes that had been present
on 400 North for months and a rainbird shooting out into the streets.
However, the real reason Kynaston was stopped was because Russell Mahan,
City Prosecutor, had ordered the Bountiful City Police to look for a blue
Camero with an old gray-haired man driving that Camero and stop that vehicle
and harass him, and to check for a driver's license.
Don Kynaston was stopped, asked for his driver's license, which he could
not produce even though Kynaston had tried to get one and through
technical problems, he had not yet received it.

8
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Course of the Proceedings, Cont.

The Appellant was arrested, not given his right (Miranda), the vehicle in
which he was driving was searched without permission, and without a Fourth
Amendment warrant, and certain property disappeared.

Kynaston was booked and

jailed, and was released under appearance bond in the morning of July 8, 1990.
Kynaston appeared

in Bountiful, Circuit Court on July 23, 1990 for

arraignment, without Counsel because he could not afford one.
Judge S. Mark Johnson if this was a criminal action.
criminal action."

Kynaston asked

He said "Yes, this was a

The trial was set for July 28, 1990.

Kynaston declared

that his rights were being violated.
On July 23, 1990, the Appellant sent Letter #1 to S. Mark Johnson and
appealed to the Judge to take a neutral stance in this matter and asked the
Court seeking protection from the excessive zeal of corporation government
(Bountiful City) and requiring the Corporate Plaintiff in a criminal action to
prove in its personam criminal jurisdiction over the Accused, to be a fact of
law before the Court (Bountiful City Court) would take on the role of judging
the fact of law before that of this legislative charge brought before the
trial Judge Johnson.
On August

The Appellant was asking for a preliminary hearing.

1990, the Accused

sent S. Mark Johnson a second

demanding his rights guaranteed Sua Sponte.

letter

The Judge ignored both letters.

The fact that demand was made for the corporate entity to prove its
jurisdiction, these demands were ignored completely.
On July 28, 1991, the trial was started and the Accused motioned the
Court to dismiss the charges because 1) the rights of the Accused had been

9

Course of the Proceedings, Cont.

denied procedural due process 2) no preliminary examination 3) that the trial
Judge was prejudiced 4) that there was no Counsel for defense 5) that the
Defendant demanded corporate Bountiful City to prove its jurisdiction over the
Defendant.

Kynaston submitted an Affidavit of Prejudice against S. Mark

Johnson and the trial process with testimony containing by Julie Wilcox.
The trial adjourned for lunch and was resumed about 3:00 p.m.

The Trial

Judge decided to have a continuance until another Judge could decide on the
Affidavit of Prejudice.
The trial resumed on September

11, 1990 with the testimony of Julie

Wilcox, police office for Bountiful, testifying that she did not have to have
probable cause.

The Trial Judge neyer

asked any questions to the Defendant

whether he wanted help or needed Counsel and proceeded without Counsel for the
defense.
The Defendant could not and did not have sufficient legal training to
defend himself against the adversaries, and the Trial
prejudice against the Accused by his actions.

Judge

proved

his

Kynaston was entitled to have

Counsel at the onset of July at the arraignment, on July 23, 1990 and at the
trial and sentencing on July 28 and September 11, 1990.
The Judge knew that Kynaston was entitled to Counsel, because of the
Judge's experience and knowledge in criminal trials and because the Judge's
Benchbook was only two feet away from his eyes and nose.

Any mistakes the

Judge made was because of prejudice and his determination to send Kynaston to
jail.
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DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
On the 11th of September, 1990 following Kynaston's Objection to the
trial, the Defendant was sentenced to thirty-two days in Davis County Jail.
The Defendant pleaded to the Judge not to send him to jail, but S. Mark
Johnson would not listen.
Kynaston was arrested following the trial, handcuffed and transported to
Davis County Jail, booked and incarcerated.
The prisoner Kynaston was told in jail to remove his street clothes and
put on jail clothes.

Kynaston refused to remove his priesthood garments.

Oliverson said, "If you don't take 'em off, we'll do it for you."
still refused.

At that time the jail guard, Kim Oliverson,

Kynaston by pushing Kynaston down in the shower stall.

Kim

Kynaston

brutalized

This action started

considerable stress to Kynaston with headaches and fear.
At 4:00 p.m. Kynaston asked Kim Oliverson for his glipazide to control
his diabetes.

Kynaston asked a second time for his medication, and was

refused a second time at about 6:00 p.m.

At 9:00 p.m., Kynaston asked Kim

Oliverson for the jail doctor because he was feeling unbalanced and dizzy.

He

was refused medical help.
At about 10:00 p.m., Kynaston started to suffer from shortness of breath.
Pains in his arms, shoulders, jaw and pain in his chest.

Kynaston called for

a guard who called for' the jail E.M.T., who called the County Paramedics.
They examined Kynaston, and the Paramedics administered

Morphine,

called

Lakeview Emergency Room, and were told to transport the patient Kynaston to
the Emergency Room at Lakeview Hospital, still in custody.

11

Disposition at Trial Court, Cont.

Kynaston was delivered to Lakeview Emergency Room and was examined by
William T. Saddler, M.D. and was taken to the Intensive Care Unit.

Kynaston

spent six days in Intensive Care and Recovery Care.
Kynaston was released and returned to Davis County Jail to pick up his
property.

He was again locked up for about one hour.

The Judge issued an order to Kynaston to present himself to Davis County
Jail to serve the remainder of his jail sentence.

Kynaston

was

still

suffering from angina, shortness of breath and vertigo.
Judge S. Mark Johnson rescinded his recommended Order when a letter from
Dr. Saddler told Johnson that incarceration might be fatal to Kynaston if he
were jailed again.

According to the record, Kynaston was in custody of Davis

County Sheriff during all of this time.
The medical and hospital charges and bill for Dr* William R. Saddler
amounted to over $6,600.00.

The Davis County Sheriff's Department has refused

to pay the full amount for these services, dumping over $1,090.00 on the
Defendant, claiming Kynaston was released from custody after the fourth day of
hospital confinement.

However, the Defendant was locked up for about one hour

and confined again when he returned to recover his property.

No one informed

Mr. Kynaston that he was no longer in custody.
The fact is that Judge S. Mark Johnson, Russell Mahan, Julie Wilcox and
the Davis County Jail

created all of this hell and health problems for

Kynaston.
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STATEMENT OF FACT
1.

Kynaston was stopped, not based on articulated objective fact.

2.

Kynaston

has been denied due process since 1985, suspension of his

driver's license, 5th and 14th Amendments.
3.

Kynaston

was tried

for a crime when

Bountiful

City lacked proper

jurisdiction, having been challenged.
4.

Kynaston was denied Counsel by S. Mark Johnson when required by the Sixth
Amendment, Argersinger, Utah Supreme Court and the Judge's Benchbook.

5.

Kynaston's stop was an unlawful arrest and unlawful search.

6.

Kynaston suffered severe punishment, damage to his reputation, to his
finances, to his health by brutal treatment while incarcerated in the
Davis County Jail.

7.

Kynaston

is being charged with the hospital and medical bills during

confinement.
8.

Kynaston did not commit any crimes.

9.

Kynaston was entitled to Defense Counsel by Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 1966.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This case was tried against the Defendant in an atmosphere of harassment
and denial

of due process from start to finish.

The Defendant

Kynaston

challenged the authority of Bountiful City by two letters to Judge S. Mark
Johnson (see letters marked 1 and 2 ) . The Trial Judge is required by law to
challenge the jurisdiction of Bountiful.

He did not.

"Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven, Hagens vs. Levine,"
415, U.S. 533.

(For corpus delicti.)

Under Common law, there is no crime if three conditions are not present:
1.

Intent.

2.

Damage to property or injury of a person.

3.

Negligence.

Bountiful City could not prove any of these conditions.
68-3-1.

Common Law Adopted.

The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or
in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or
the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is
consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions
of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby
adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this
state.
Common Law cannot be lawfully derogated by any legislation because Common
Law is the basis of all ancient laws, the Talmud, the Ten Commandments, the
Common

Law of Northern

Europe, the English Magna Carta and our federal

Constitution.
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Summary of the Arguments, Cont.

State and Bountiful Statutes 41-2-136 and 41-2-150 are Civil Statutes.
It is immoral and unlawful to use Civil Statutes as evidence of the law in a
criminal action.

HARASSMENT
Mr. Kynaston has been a victim of gross harassment on this matter.

In a

earlier case concerning the driver's licence issue, the Defendant was harassed
by the Bountiful City Prosecutor when Kynaston
Impecunity in Layton's Second Circuit Court.
to appear

in that Court

was seeking

a status

of

Having been notified and ordered

by the Judge, Russell Mahan, Bountiful

City

Prosecutor, went out of his way to argue against Kynaston's right to receive
impecunity status.
At the end of this hearing, Russell Mahan harassed Mr. Kynaston by
threatening and harassing him if he drove a car.
calling the Layton
Kynaston drove.
Kynaston's

Mahan threatened Kynaston by

City Police to have Kynaston arrested and jailed if

Mahan further

harassed

Kynaston

by going

up and

home street and asking Kynaston's neighbors personal

about his personal life and his finances.

down

questions

The harassment continued.

Mahan also investigated the property records of Kynaston at the Davis
County Courthouse and the local banks.

Mahan went out of his way by calling

the Bountiful City Police to be on the lookout for a blue 1975 Camero and to
stop and harass the driver.
Mr. Russell Mahan told the Defendant in his office that he was going to
order Bountiful City Police to harass Mr. Kynaston and threaten him with

15

Detail of the Arguments, Cont.

arrest and jail and do other things of a harassing nature.

Russell Mahan, all

this time knew that Kynaston was attempting to get a driver's license.
The true reason Mr. Kynaston was stopped on the night of July 7, 1990 was
because of harassment ordered by Bountiful City Prosecutor and over-zealous
Russell Mahan, and not because Mr. Kynaston had committed a real crime.
On the day of the trial

of this matter, Russell Mahan ordered the

Bountiful City Police to follow the Defendant around Bountiful at lunch break.
Mr. Mahan threatened Mr. Kynaston several times of arrest and jail if Mr.
Kynaston drove.
Harassment Title 18 U.S.C.A. Section 1514.
Term is used in a variety of legal contexts to describe words,
gestures and actions which tend to annoy, alarm and abuse (verbally)
another person; e.g., the use of "Obscene or profane language or
language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or
reader"

is unlawful

harassment

Collection Practices Act.

under

the

Federal

Fair

Debt

15 U.S.C.A. Section 1692(d)(2).

Sexual harassment by employers against employees is recognized
as a cause of action under Title VII of the Oral Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000e et seq., e.g., Tomkins v. Public Service
Electric & Gas Co., C.A.N.J., F.2d 1044.
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass
another, he:

(1) makes a telephone call without

purpose of

legitimate communication; or (2) insults, taunts or

challenges

another

in a manner

likely to provoke violent or disorderly

response; or (3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at
16
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extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively course language; or
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or (5) engages in any
other course of alarming conduct servicing no legitimate purpose of
the actor.

Model Penal Code, Section 250.4.

Judge S. Mark Johnson and Russell Mahan were determined to get Kynaston
convicted and jailed, regardless of how many of Kynaston's civil rights were
violated.

Both Judge S. Mark Johnson and Russell Mahan knew that Kynaston

would be convicted and sentenced to jail before the trial ever started.

Both

Johnson and Mahan knew or should have known that Kynaston was entitled to:
1.

Preliminary hearing

2.

Discovery

3.

Counsel at time of arraignment

4*

Counsel at trial

5.

Counsel at sentencing

more commonly known as due process.
Ignorance of the law is not excuse.
is no excuse.

Violation of the Defendant's rights

Both Judge Johnson and Mahan knew that Judge Johnson

was

required to inform the Defendant of his rights before the trial proceeded—and
he failed to do it.
Judge's Benchbook Checklist
5. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
A person accused of a crime has the right to be assisted by counsel
his d e f e n s e .
The accused may waive his right, but he must do
intelligently, competently, and without coercion. The court must protect
defendant in this regard. If the right to counsel is waived, the accused
represent himself, subject to the rules of criminal procedure.

17

in
so
the
may

Detail of the Arguments, Cont.
When a person is financially unable to retain an attorney and does not
waive his right, the court must appoint an attorney for him. The court is ncrt
obligated to appoint an attorney whom the accused requests, but the judge must
be satisfied that the assigned counsel is competent to handle the defense. A
conviction may be reversed if the action of the appointed counsel reduces the
trial to a sham.
5.1

Right to Counsel
In criminal prosecutions the defendant has the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel.
Utah Const., art I, sec. 12.
See also Rules of Crim. Proc. sec. 77-35—8.

and
Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant
must be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel
in open court. The defendant must not be required to plead until he
has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
Rules of Crim. P r o c , sec. 77-35-11(a)

and
5.2

No Imprisonment When No Counsel
Absent knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether misdemeanor or felony, unless
represented by counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,92 S.Ct.
2006, 32 L. Ed., 2d 530 (1972)

and
5.3

Fundamental Right to Counsel
The privilege of an accused to the assistance of counsel is a
fundamental right. It means the right to a reputable member of the
bar who is willing and in a position honestly and conscientiously to
represent the interests of the defendant.
State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887,

Mrrmrr.—

and

18
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5.4

Advise that Court Will Appoint If Needed
A court must advise a defendant that if he cannot obtain counsel
through his own resources the court will provide counsel for him.
It may not accept a waiver of counsel unless the accused understands
that representation may be obtained even though he or she lacks
financial resources.
Nielsen v. Turner, 287 F. Supp. 116, 121, 122
(d. Utah 1968).
See also Rules of Crim. P r o c , sees.
77-35-7(a)(4)(iii) and 77-35-lHa)

Both Mahan and Judge Johnson knew that Kynaston was financially unable to
hire a lawyer at $100.00 per hour.
Second

Circuit

Mahan was in attendance at a hearing in

Court of Layton City when Judge Parley R. Baldwin heard

arguments from the Defendant asking the Court to grant Kynaston impecunious
status.

Judge Baldwin did that.

particular case.

Nielsen was appointed to appeal that

At Court, Judge S. Mark Johnson

NEVER EVEN ASKED

if

Defendant needed Counsel.
This entire miscarriage of justice started

in 1984 when Kynaston was

involved in an accident at 600 North and 700 East when Kynaston ran into a
vehicle, causing considerable damage to the other vehicle.
failed to yield the right of way to Kynaston's vehicle.

The other driver

Kynaston received an

accident report and the other driver received a ticket for failure to yield.
Kynaston filed the accident report, which included his insurance carrier.
Somehow the report was

lost or misplaced.

notification of a hearing.

Kynaston has never

received

Kynaston received a notice that his driver's

license had been suspended for lack of financial responsibility before any
hearing.

19
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Through research, Kynaston discovered that he was entitled to a hearing
prior to losing his privilege of driving a motor vehicle.

Through further

research he discovered that several other of his rights had been disallowed.
Kynaston has received several tickets, has been fined, jailed and has
been deprived of due process and harassed for six years.
1.

Kynaston was deprived of his driver's privilege without procedural due
process as required in the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments.

2.

Bountiful

City never proved

its jurisdiction when demanded from the

Defendant.
3.

The arresting officer, Julie Wilcox, commits perjury in open Court by
denying she needed probable cause.

4.

Russell Mahan and Bountiful police unlawfully harassed Defendant.

5.

Bountiful

City police unlawfully searched Defendant's vehicle without

permission or a Fourth Amendment warrant.
6.

Bountiful City police unlawfully arrested the Defendant without giving
him the Miranda warning.

7.

Judge

S. Mark

Johnson

failed to give the Defendant protection from

corporate zealots like Russell Mahan, et al. (Bountiful City).
8.

Judge S. Mark Johnson failed to protect Kynaston's Constitutional and
civil rights by not informing Kynaston of his rights.

9.

Judge S. Mark Johnson unlawfully arraigned, tried and sentenced Kynaston
to thirty-two days in the Davis County Jail, without benefit of Defense
Counsel, even after Kynaston objected to all of the proceedings, claiming
his rights were being violated and being over-ruled by the Judge.

20
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10.

Judge S. Mark Johnson tried and sentenced the Defendant after Kynaston
claimed the Judge was prejudiced against

Kynaston, disregarding

an

Affidavit of Prejudice filed against S. Mark Johnson.
11.

Kynaston, the Defendant, was brutalized in the Davis County Jail, denied
his medical prescription, denied help and medical assistance from the
Jail doctor, and suffered personal humiliation from Jail guards.

12.

Kynaston was in full custody of the Davis County Sheriff, even though the
Defendant was confined in Intensive Care most of the time.

13.

The Defendant Kynaston has suffered permanent, extensive damage to his
health as a result of the unlawful acts of Bountiful City, Russell Mahan,
Bountiful Police Department and Judge S. Mark Johnson.

14.

Kynaston continues to suffer from angina, shortness of breath, headaches,
weakness and nausea.

CONCLUSIONS
The Petitioner concludes by simply asking the court to rectify the wrongs
perpetrated

by the government which appears to, in some areas, becoming

despotic.
It is the belief of the Petitioner that it is important that from time to
time we return to the fundamental principles that made this nation so great
and reflect on the past and to be aware of the direction we are going.

21

RELIEF SOUGHT
The Defendant asks this Honorable Court to reverse the guilty judgment
rendered by the Bountiful Second Circuit Court.
Issue a permanent Restraining Order against S. Mark Johnson, Bountiful
City, Russell Mahan and Bountiful police from harassing the Defendant and
his family.
Compensate the Defendant for the time and expense and suffering to the
Defendant and to his family.
Order the Davis County Sheriff to pay all medical and hospital costs
incurred by the Defendant.
Order Bountiful City to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees for all costs of
preparing his defense and cost of appeal.
Order

disciplinary

measures to all of those responsible for

the

miscarriage of justice in this case.
Order the Driver's License Division of the Department of Public Safety
Commission to "GET THEIR HORSE BEFORE THEIR CART" by complying to demands
and orders of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell vs. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
1971 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
"Serious consequences also may result from convictions not
punishable by imprisonment. Losing one's driver's license
is more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in
jail.
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), we said:
'Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit
of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus
involves state action that adjudicates important interests
of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to
be taken away without that procedural due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Id., at 539.
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Relief Sought, Cont.

The Fourteenth Amendment of The Constitution of the United States of
America States:
"Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
8.

The Petitioner also asks this Honorable Court to reverse all of the
unlawful convictions issued against the Defendant caused by the lack of
due process administered

by the Driver's License Division Utah Public

Safety Commission.
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ADDENDUM PART
Dr R. KYNASTON
5l<. North 750 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010

jfr

' I
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, CITY OF BOUNTIFUL
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

A,,
o, 'UG 0 o
^At*

STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE

£

^8 'O

^

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 9022886

DON R. KYNASTON,
Accused.
00O00

COMES NOW the Accused, Don R. Kynaston, and hereby demands that S. Mark
Johnson, Judge in the Second Circuit Court, recuse himself from this action or
any other action concerning the Accused because he has shown extreme prejudice
in this case and in former actions where this Accused person was denied due
process of law, unlawfully jailed and unlawfully fined.
The Accused declares that this Court and Judge Johnson are in violation
of Article 7, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of Utah
Code of Criminal Procedure 77-32 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5), 77-32-2, 77-32-3, 77-32-4,
77-32-5, 77-32-6, 77-32-7 and 77-35-8, 77-35-16(B).
The Accused also declares that S. Mark Johnson was in violation of
Section 12^ Utah State Constitution when in a former case he tried to
unlawfully force the Accused to post a $500.00 bond before the Accused could
appeal a conviction in his Court based on an unlawful trial.
It is not the prerogative of any Court or Judge of the same to assume
anything.

Courts must rely on facts or testimony before any ruling, and is

clearly forbidden by law to assume anything to be fact before moving forward
to set trial or any procedure.

I h e r e f o r e , t h e A c c u s e d D o n K j n a s t o r i p e t i 1i o n s t h i s C o u r t o r

Constitutional due process from the arraignment on for ward (Sua Sponte),
Therefore, tl le Accused petitions those in authority to appoint: a neutr al

Supreme Court k itl i a Wr it of Pr ohibition ti :> ii iter ver le and take this matter to
a competent court for further disposition.
Si ibn n'tted tl Ms ^ ^

z

t

da ) o I ' ^ ^ ^ ^

_, 1990,

Respectfully submitted,

DON R. KYNASTOj

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE this ^ / ^ T d a y o f ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^
, 1990.
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Ju !y 3 0 , 1990

Honorable S. Mark Johnson
745 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utal i 84010' , . .

" ' '

/.'

Dear Judge Johnson:
Wl lei i I appeared befor e yoi it Court on 23r d o1 ' July, 1990 on a forced
response to a bill of pains and penalties, Citation No, B779798 issued by
Officer Julie Wilcox, employed by Bountiful City, Davis County, State of Utah.,
I move this Court to take judicial notice, that my appearance was forced, and
that my appearance is special
f his notice is my timely objection to the
presumptions upon which a false conclusion of law has been made
administratively with regard to my status before this Court. The Plaintiff in
this case is an administrative officer in Bountiful City, State of Utah which
has legislative power to compel performance on the letter of its statutes upon
all persons subject to its jurisdiction. The only due process that these
legislative tribunals recognize is that the accused, only has the right to be
heard on the facts of the case. The Corporate Plaintiff in this action before
this Court has made an unproven conclusion of law that Don R. Kynaston is
among those persons who have los t their status in the Republic and must
perform under legislative power upon the exact letter of eyery legislative
statute, with no due process of law or protection other than that outlined in
paragraph two of this letter. It is from this false conclusion of law that
Administrative Officer Julie Wilcox isssued the contested bill of pains and
penalties upon Don R. Kynaston in this case,
Judicia ! Notice must be taken by this Court that Don R. Kynaston, an
unenfranchised individual, has made a contrary conclusion of law to that of
the Plaintiff. He claims guaranteed rights stemming from both the Federal and
State Constitutions to full due process of law in all criminal actions against
him, which means that he is subject only to judicial power not legislative
power, and said judicial power when exercised over him requires a Corpus
Delicti, or damaged party who has sworn out a complaint against him. This is
lacking in the case brought on by Plaintiff, so the Accused declares that his
unenfranchised status as a citizen of the Republic known as the United States
of America and a dweller in the State of Utah. Without a Corpus Delicti or
damaged party, no court, judicial or legislative, has a criminal jurisdiction
over this person. Therefore, the Accused appeared before the law side of this
Court seeking its protection from the excessive zeal of Corporation
government, ^ust^ng that this Court would assume a neutral stance at law and
require the Corporate Plaintiff in the criminal action to prove its in
personam criminal jurisdiction over the Accused, to be a fact of law before
this Court would take ?r the r- "U- -f .judc^y the fact of tnis legislative
charge brought before
Respect, f-j"
•*'

*y

s

Don R. Kynaston
512 North 750 East
B o u n t 4 r V "t.^ s

tz*^L~*f>
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ADDENDUM P A R T 3

Honorable S. Mark Johi
745 South Main Street
Bountiful, l't~h
^rvDear Judge u nn
This letter will grant you the opportunity to study your file to the
numbered case 9022886, that you have threatened the liberty and/or property of
this person, made in hast from the equity side of your court.
You acted
without a lawful jurisdiction. As you know or should know, a judge at law
performs in a manner quite different from a Chancellor in equity. Undoubtedly
you have sat so long as a Chancellor in equity that you have lost sight of
your alternate position as a judge at law, and you may be unaware of your duty
to function and act in that capacity, but you are requested to do so on
constitutional issues.
It is within your alternate duty to function as a
judge at law. Your contract of employment required you to swear an oath to
obey, defend and protect the Federal and Utah State Constitutions, recognizing
them as the supreme law of the land when you assume the role as judge at law.
Your failure to recognize the Constitution as the "supreme law of the land
following your oath of office disenfranchises you as a judge at law and makes
you an individual open to charges of perjury for having made a false oath.
.Now to tl le case in point, since a controversy of law existed between a
public servant, Officer Wilcox, and employed by Bountiful City, Davis County,
State of Utah.
It involved the rights guaranteed to all citizens of this
Republic by the supreme law of the land, which law is above every legislative
statute. I, Don R. Kynaston, wrote you a specific letter regarding contrary
conclusions of law in this case requesting you to appear on the law side of
your court, asking for your protection as a judge at law from the excessive
zeal of the Corporate government wherein said government brings on a criminal
action under a legislative equity jurisdiction where Constitutional rights are
ignored and legislative statutes become the supreme law of the legislative
courts. This is contrasted with the judicial court in what constitutes due
process of law.
Legislative e q u H j can be a lawful jurisd>cti-j . 1: -•<[.•[, :^s primarily to
corporate entities and the individuals who are under contract with government,
which contract usually takes the form of a franchise of one form or another.
It might also be a jurisdiction presumed to be lawful to those that do not
timely and specifically object to it on constitutional grounds. The presumed
lawfulness of this legislative jurisdiction in equity in personam ends however
the moment it is objected to on constitutional grounds. The above should have
been recognized by you from my letter in yoi ir file dated August 8, 1990.
You shou Id ! lave responded from the law side of your court.
i our
jurisdiction is here established while you lacked any jurisdiction in equity
when I requested your presence on the law side to hear a constitutional issue,
which you must do before taking up an .issue of fact on the equity side.

In it » 'espoi iding to the law side of your cour t, the Federal ...- . :. ...-itConstitutions which are the supreme law of the land set t h e tone of your
response, and form the basis of any judgment which you make.
You are then
sitting as a judge at law, which is as much your duty as sitting as fiance" ;or
in equity under t h e legislative side of your duty.
Since jurisdiction in
equity is lacking at this time for you, and can only be established when ond
if the Plaint:ft in this case enters the law side of your court. With ,-JU
sitting as a neutral judge at law and by Plaintiff placing in evidence a valid
contract of franchise which proves a fact of law that the accused Don R.
Kynaston is under contract obligation as a franchised individual to obey every
legislative statue upon the letter of the statute, having lost h-~ n n h p a "
rights under the constitution f ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ * c ,.,^e^ T?4-ie 49 ucr
Wit! 1 such proof on the recoro or the law side or your court, y~u could
then enter the equity side as Chancellor in legislative equity w u n proven
authority or jurisdiction to issue orders such as you did on July 23, 1990 to
me. M y failure to perform cou'H t*e*-. ^^-.11. -v .m arrest warrant a^:i ja :
a contempt of court charge.
With the above information in my file, and a copy of this letter, which
wiII also be filed with the Clerk of the Court, I feel you will take notice of
your employment contract and act accordingly from the law side of your court,
voiding your form letter dated July 2 3 , 1990, wherein from the equity side you
ordered me to appear and * ^ ^ ^ w ~ , ,„ u e rjt.,rr* +.. -^ __..., r... _ n ,
r
contempt of court charge.
I! you f a n to correct your order wherein you iacK jurisdiction and 1 am
arrested and jailed, m y legal r e m e d y f o r an o r d e r g i v e n w i t h o u t legal
jurisdiction is H* •; conin^?. law W<*t of Prohibition against your
.rder <xr\o
filing a complaint against y o u personally as an individual. Your acts outside
of y o u r lawful authority to act will have caused unlimited damage to my
person, property and my reputation ^ having spent time in jail or prisoi
w i l l p r e s s t h a t c o m p l a i n t t o t h e fullest extent of the law, since your
unlawful act will have been willful in view ^f thp nntirp n-u/pr *.-. wn; in ±-r_u.
letter.
1 w i 1 1 wa; * .•-.-': •.;,•, ; ^
. ;-ts oc liwii Tor f: vt days before x —•-... o
Writ of Prohibition -n trie Federal :"ourt and have pending law suits and civil
rights v i o l a t e s brought against you *or just cause.
Respectfu i

Don R. Kynastort
512 North 7 5 0 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby
August

2-L

certify that i sent a true and correct copy of the letter dated

8, 1990 to Honorable S. Mark Johnson and Clerk of the Court this
day of

y^

1990.

Don R. Kynaston

ADDENDUM PART 4

Fred C. Sw ind imar i
Department of Public Safety
Office of Drivers License Servut-s
Financial Responsibility Seat
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah M l i'"J"
Ft

""""ic "1 r-d Petition for Hear inq
^1-443419

Dear M*- Swindiman:
r./rdston, c e r * : \ \ V az :.r,f statemeti
perjury is t f j e and correct •? * ^;:^Pi-*
.i-.:
any *a* * *(
content
1

.,;, ,;ut

.i.aii •• JI

r

•:« -1- ^HIH^ the penalties of
- +. * c: 5<r ir f i c t i t i o u s in

~ + ^w" ' « " veHr 1 *

2. That Don - ^ast.'- na lever -.t., - ar ac.idP't wnk: ; respite :r. r ersonal
injury or damage t:. anr.tu- ***- ^ - , r ^ r t
i
3. h'r\at Dor .v*dv
*^:
^pgui^en ircidpnt report acco*'::^ ;:>
!
law A • • TV <e- .*- ss.-it • fc*our ^ f ^ u , uateo Mr^-.ane, 1964.

4.

*'Ml . '•- •• '•*--»

Coun*-. tr.ct
5.

'•-'•• t

:-c Ia*"Pd

*>'

"),;*: ^ rv -p atmauv*

impecunious

Ov

«• ,'^y * - ti-i ,i" s c

n-cr ^s. t<e+ort 3

;

. 1 / *n

'rr,, * 'our*.

* '*--:

J.tv'S

T -'-arspo*".

: ». ;•

matt-* -

6.
*^j«o
;fc rt^uu^eu, anc I-H-I ^^^ r b . T ivcr^ Licence Department to
dismiss tnis c;^e betause the Accused nas r>ut received due process in the form
of having not been tried according to tne due process required in the
Fourteenth Amendment and as stated in the decision of Argersinger vs. Hamlin
Sheriff, 407 U S at 48. The Court said: .
"Serious c0nsequences a 1 s0 may resu 11 f*r0in c0n vi ct i 0ns n01
punishable by imprisonment. Losing one's driver's license is more
serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), we said: 'Once licenses are issued, as
in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important
interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to
be taken away without11 that procedural due process required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. " Id., at 539.

The Four i **
I n. -1 .1 1 i
I II
IU I til "it d 1t i
America states:
Section :
persons :
x naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce an> "-.*. * :'?• shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of tne United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to a - .--•;.' *."*:'" J'!J V isdiction the equal protection
of

t h r •» •

of

-

.n the Accused's *,a.se. t^e Utah State Driver's License Division has
suspended t ^ Accused's driver's license ("privilege") without benefit of due
process ! trial) hearing or any other Constitutional guarantees.
lf» addition, the Accused has been ordered to put up a bond of $1,025.00,
a tax, in order to conduct his affairs, even though there is no proof that the
Accused is a threat or potential danger to himself, to the public, or to their
p^ooe^ty

This procedure is not valid because it denies due process according to
Constitutional protections and guarantees in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh
Amendments
The procedure of the Driver's License Division violates Artieie 9,
Paragraph 3. The State may not pass a Bill of Attainder or Bill of Pains as
described in Chapter 1?, T:tle 4 ] , u.C.A.
Therefore the AC« i-en p>r K ^ *l •-.* •-.. ^ .
^UitJ.
DATED tris

rj. .

- A,;; ,**

-39.

Respectfully Suomittea,

DON R. KYNASTON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to oefore m u. .^

NKVA
K- "ommission Expires:

~
Joy of August

lyby.

ADDENDUM PAT*; J ::i

DON R. KYNASTON
512 North 750 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010

I l.^ C *-*
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The date of arraignment
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' I he statement of f a c t i n a? id issue are t h e f o l l o w i n g :

APPELLAN I Doi i R I ',} r lastoi i was s topped ::)i i 1 00 I Ic i til i appi ox imate Ih a i: 500
E a s t on. J u l y 7 , 1990 a t abou t 11:30 p.m.

Arresting Officer J u l i e W ilcox t o l d

Kynaston that he was stopped for e r r a t i c driv ing, having a hunch that Kynaston
f ii it: t I i e p r o f i I e o 1 ' a d i u i i k , w h ii c I t w a s i i o It: It: i i i e

W T x c x asked for vehicle registration and driver's license.

Kynaston

aske-: wiidt tl »e probable cause was, Wilcox said she did not need probable
C .; ., i - •

V ^ c o x called and checked for records. Kynaston was found to be driv ing
on suspension .ino that t in boierh warrants were oi i file
and

h a n d c u f" t e 11 j r I 11 | I

Kynaston was arrested

111 1111" | 11 11II i «11 \ i i t I m o u 1: II I ; r i a s t o i i b e i n g g i v e i i I i i s

right.
["he vehic le in wh
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and vs ithout a •! t h Amendment
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.,.,., ^ „_- .
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- ^

Tivsr-or

and was released on $1,250.00 bail bond.
On July 23, 1990, Don Kynaston appeared in Bountiful City Court for
arraignment and was arraigned by S. Mark Johnson without counsel, who claimed
statutory jurisdiction.

Johnson determined that driving on suspension was a

crime and that this action was a criminal action.
Kynaston was charged with violating Bountiful Traffic Code 41-2-136 and
41-6-150, a Civil Statute, mysteriously now becoming a criminal action.

S.

Mark Johnson violated Kynaston's rights by entering a plea for the Accused and
by not allowing the Accused to make a third choice, a demure, making the
arraignment null and void.
It is not the prerogative of any Court or Judge to assume anything.
Court must rely on facts or testimony before any ruling, and is clearly
forbidden by law to assume anything to be fact before moving forward to set
trial or any other procedure.
On July 30, 1990, the Accused sent a letter to S. Mark Johnson asking the
Court to protect Don R. Kynaston's rights.
court.

No answer was received from the

Refer to letter marked #1.

On August 2, 1990, the Accused also sent S. Mark Johnson a second letter
demanding that the rights of the Accused be protected sua sponte and asked
that the jurisdiction of the City be proved by producing a corpus delicti,
someone who could testify that Don R. Kynaston had injured or damaged them, as
must be done in a criminal trial.

See letter #2.

S. Mark Johnson would not answer either of these letters.
submitted an Affidavit of Prejudice.

The Accused

The Court proceeded with the trial even

after the Accused objected to the trial because Don R. Kynaston had been
denied due process and that S. Mark Johnson was prejudice in past trials.
Affidavit of Prejudice.
3

See

The trial proceeded with testimony from Officer Julie Wilcox that the
Accused appeared to be drunk.

She testified that he was not.

Again Officer

Wilcox testified that she did not need probable cause to stop me.
The truth of the facts are that Appellant was driving and swerving to
miss chuck holes and sprinklers that were shooting out into the streets, and
there were no other cars on 400 North at that time.
The Court found Don R. Kynaston guilty and sentenced him to thirty (30)
days in the County Jail for driving on suspension and two (2) days for driving
on bald tires.
The trial was unlawful and in error because of the following issues on
record:
A.

The Accused was denied due process in that the City did not
produce a corpus delicti or a contract or that the Accused was a
franchised individual or a corporation required to obey every
letter, word, sentence of the state statute.

B.

The Accused was not represented at any time at arraignment or
during trial or sentencing by counsel and was not asked if he
wanted counsel.

The Bountiful Circuit Court lost true jurisdiction by repeatedly denying
the Appellant's CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, whiqh were already secured by the Utah
and U.S. Constitutions.

The Appellant's rights denied included Right to

Counsel of Choice, Sua Sponte, Right of Discovery, Right of the Jury to decide
matters of Law and Fact, and the Right of Proper time for defense to make
objections.
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has
been denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions,
including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The
denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of
a jail sentence. (Argersinger vs. Hamlin Sheriff)
4

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.
"Nor shall be compelled in any case to be a witness against
himself." (Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution)
The Appellant's right has been violated inasmuch as the alleged crime,
although a misdemeanor, can be classified as being an infamous crime, by
definition, due to the nature of the punishment the accused has the right to
assist the Government to proceed against him by the way of a Grand Jury
Indictment and not by information only.
"It is not the character of the crime but the nature of the
punishment which renders the crime infamous."
Weeks vs.
U.S.C.C.A.N.Y., 216 F 292, 298
"Whether an offense is infamous depends on the punishment which
was imposed." U.S. vs. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 G Ct. 368, 370
"By the revised statutes of New York the term finfamous crime1
when used in any statute, is directed to be construed as including
every offense punishable with death, or by imprisonment in a State
prison, and no other." Black's Law Dictionary, pg. 446
The Accused by his actions, which actions could be considered criminal by
the State, has shown a deep respect for the law of the land and the State by
exerting his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles to the
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the actions taken by the Bountiful
City are a threat to the accused and to the accused's liberty and property.
ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN, SHERIFF
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
No. 70-5015. Argued December 6, 1971—Reargued February 28, 1972
Decided June 12, 1972
"The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the
assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth,
(Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335), is not governed by the
classification of the offense or by whether or not a jury trial is
required. No accused mav be deprived of his liberty as the result
of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which
he was denied the assistance of counsel. In this case, the Supreme
Court of Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who

5

was tried for an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six
months, a $1,000 fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence,
had no right to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the
right extends only to trials 'for non-petty offenses punishable by
more than six months imprisonment.'" Pp. "27-40, 236 So.2nd.442,
reversed.
In Powell v. Alabama and Gideon, both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately
their own cases, much less identify and argue relevant legal questions.
Many petty offenses will also present complex legal and factual issues
that may not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by counsel.
Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or
some other handicap, will be incapable of defending themselves. The
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period
served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or
the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label "petty."
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable
by imprisonment. Stigma may attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a
hit-and-run escapade. Losing one's driver's license is more serious for
some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Ld, at 539.
This procedure was denied to Petitioner.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that property, as well as
life and liberty, may not be taken from a person without affording him due
process of law.

The Judge's own handbook prevents S. Mark Johnson from

imposing a jail sentence without counsel present.
The action taken against the Appellant is violation of his Fourth, Fifth,(*y
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
3.

It is an unlawful abuse of procedure to use a Civil Statute as

evidence of the law in a criminal action.
4.

The trial judge was prejudice.

At about 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990, Don R. Kynaston was arrested in
Bountiful City Court and transported to Davis County Jail. The convicted was
6

booked, finger printed and photographed and was told to remove his street
clothes and his religious garments.
Kynaston objected and refused to do so, and was threatened by the guards
that my garments would be removed by force if I didn't do it.
pushed down by the guard in the shower room.
did not remove my garments.

Kynaston was

I put on the jail clothes, but

Kynaston asked to see the jail doctor and was

denied by the same guard.
Kynaston asked to receive the medication Glybizide for diabetes, and the
medication was denied until about 9:00, causing him to become dizzy.

About

11:00 p.m., I became ill, having a very difficult time breathing, gasping for
breath.

Shortly after I developed a pain in my left arm, shoulder and neck.

I asked the guard for help and they responded by calling the jail E.M.T.
The E.M.T. called the paramedics for assistance.

The paramedics called the

Lakeview Emergency Room for advice, and Don R. Kynaston was transported to
Lakeview Emergency Room.

On the way I was given morphine for pain.

The

paramedics delivered the patient Don R. Kynaston, where Dr. William T. Saddler
attended to the patient for treatment.

I was admitted to Intensive Care for

treatment and confinement for unstable heart disease.
The Appellant hereby moves this Court to suppress the testimony of
Officer Julie Wilcox and reverse the Trial Court's judgment.
Wilcox cormitted perjury by knowing she had to have probable cause and
testified that she didn't.

Officer Wilcox's stop was based on a hunch and was

not based on articulated "objective" facts, and amounted to a seizure and
harassment of the Defendant.

The Appellant motions this Court to again

suppress the testimony of Officer Julie Wilcox and reverse the judgment of the
Trial Court.
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5.

The following statutes and case law are as follows:
United States Constitution Sixth Amendment
Article VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.

Article XIV
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Utah State Constitution
Sec. 12 [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before the final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor* shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Argersinger v. Hamlin Sheriff (70-5015)
Under the rule we announce today, eyery judge will know when the
trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed,
even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented
by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity
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of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent
the accused before the trial starts.
The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today1s ruling. But
in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's
liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of "the guiding hand
of counsel" so necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy.
Baldwin v. New York
And, as we said in Baldwin vs. New York, 399 U.S., at 73, "the
prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be
viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well
result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation."
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel
at his trial.
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with which we
agree.
Stevenson v. Holzman
It said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P.2d 414,
418:
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been
denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions,
including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The
denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of
a jail sentence.
Judge's Bench Book Check List 5, Rule 2
There will be no jail sentence without counsel present.
Code of Crim. P r o c , Sec. 77-32-1 through 77-32-7,
Rules of Crim. Proc, Sec. 77-35-8
A.

Inform defendant:
(1) Constitutional right to an attorney at every stage of the
proceedings.
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Sandy City, Plaintiff and Respondent v.
Randy Thorsness, Defendant and Appellant
No. 880637-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah
Aug. 18, 1989
1. Arrest - 63.5(4)
Automobiles - 349(2)
Officer's stop of defendant was a seizure which could be justified
only by showing of reasonable suspicion that crime had been or was
being committed or that he was stopped incident to traffic offense.
U.S.C.A. Cont.Amend. 4.
2.

Automobiles - 349(6)

Reasonable suspicion that motorist is intoxicated must be based on
articulated "objective facts" apparent to officer and reasonable
inferences drawn from them. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
6.

There are no prior appeals in this case.

The Appellant does not seek a new trial because he has already suffered
severe damage to his health and loss of freedom and suffrage, monetary damage
and defamation of his character by the action of the Bountiful City Police,
Bountiful City Prosecutor and Bountiful City Court.
The Appellant asks the Court to reverse the judgment in this case.
DATED this

%fi

day of November, 1990.
Respectfu1ly submi tted,

512 North 750 E&
Bountiful, Utah
Pro Per
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DOCKETING STATEMENT by Certified Mail to the Utah Court of Appeals and Russell
Mahan, Bountiful City Prosecutor, this ^ Q ^^^-day of November, 1990.

Don R. Kynastcm^
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SANDY CITY v THORSNESS
Cite MM 778 ?2d

I 11 (LuhApp

L tah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553, 559 (' The fee
is paid out of the award made to the complainant, the Commission having no authority to assess attome> s fees against the
opposing party as an additional penalty ")
Accordingly, we hold that the Commission
is not statutorily authorized to make
awards of attorney fees in addition to
awards of compensation benefits
Until
the Commission acquires such authonza
tion it is also powerless to "add on ' attorney fees by rule See Crowther v Xatwnwide Mut Ins Co, 762 P2d 1119 1122
(Utah CtAppl988) ("An administrative
agency s authority to promulgate regulations is limited to those regulations which
are consonant with the statutory framework, and neither contrary to the statute
nor beyond its scope ')
Wdtalso hold that the Commission erred
in apportioning liability between the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund The recent
case of Wxcat Systems v Pellegrini 111
P 2d 686 (Utah Ct App 1989), held that the
1984 amendments to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund provisions were substantive,
not procedural or remedial, and thus did
not apply retroactively Since Harrison's
industrial injury occurred in 1982, the law
in effect at that time indicates that liability
should have been apportioned thirty-nine
percent against the Workers' Compensation Fund and sixty-one percent against the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
We therefore reverse the order of 'Jie
Commission, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion In view of this result, we have no
occasion to reach the ments of other issues
raised by the parties

I tah
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SANDY CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Randy THORSNESS, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880637-CA.
Court of Appeal* of I tah
Aug 18, 1989

Defendant was convicted in the Third
Circuit Court, Sandy Department Robin W
Reese, J, of driving under the influence of
alcohol, after entering conditional no contest plea, preserving appeal to challenge
denial of pretrial motion to suppress evidence from illegal traffic stop The Court
of Appeals held that officer s stop of defendant's automobile, without observation of
suspicious behavior, was not based on articulated reasonable suspicion
Reversed and remanded

1. Arrest «=»63.5<4)
Automobiles <3=>349(2)
Officer's stop of defendant was a seizure which could be justified only by showing of reasonable suspicion that cnme had
been or was being committed or that he
was stopped incident to traffic offense
U S C A Const Amend. 4
2. Automobiles $=>349<6>
Reasonable suspicion that motorist is
intoxicated must be based on articulated
'objective facts" apparent to officer and
reasonable inferences drawn from them
U S C A Const Amend 4

Reversed and remanded
GARFF and ORME, JJ, concur

3. Automobiles £=349(6)
Absent reckless or erratic driving, defendant's slower speed and failure to
'move along immediately' at officer s request, which might have indicated innocent
behavior as well as intoxication, was not a
reasonable basis for officer to suspect defendant was intoxicated and to stop his
automobile U S C A Const Amend 4.
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George S. Diumenti, II and D. Bruce
Oliver, Diumenti & Lindsley, Bountiful, for
defendant and appellant.
Clifford W. Lark and Van Midgley, City
Attys., Sandy, for plaintiff and respondent.
Before JACKSON, ORME and
GARFF, JJ.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant was convicted cf driving under the influence of alcohol. He appeals
after entering a conditional no contest plea
to the offense. His plea was conditional in
order to preserve this appeal challenging
the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress
all evidence because of an illegal traffic
stop. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939
(Utah App.1988).
On appeal, defendant argues that he was
stopped without any reasonable suspicion
by the officer who followed him. Therefore, defendant claims, his stop was illegal
and the subsequent evidence resulting in
his conviction should have been suppressed.
We agree with defendant that his stop was
not based upon any articulated reasonable
suspicion that a crime had been committed
and, therefore, we reverse the conviction.
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.
1988).
The evidence surrounding defendant's
stop and arrest for DUI in the early morning hours of August 6, 1988, is basically
undisputed. Wre view that evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling on the suppression motion. Officer
Pingree stopped to assist a motorist whose
car was stranded in the outside lane of a
four-lane street at 1:30 a.m. The officer's
car, with lights flashing, blocked that outside lane. Driving by the scene in the
same direction, defendant pulled around
the officer's vehicle and stopped his car to
observe the activity of the officer and the
jar's occupants. When waved on by Officer Pingree, defendant hesitated momentarily, then pulled away at a "slow rate of
speed" and drove on down the street.
There was no other traffic in the area at
that early morning hour.

After he concluded his assistance with
the stranded car, Officer Pingree determined to pursue defendant's car. He
caught up with defendant and followed him
for several blocks. Officer Pingree did not
observe any suspicious or exceptionable
driving behavior, or traffic violations.
However, he noted that defendant drove
slowly in the inside lane, twenty miles per
hour in a forty-mile-per-hour zone. Defendant did not commit any traffic violations
and traffic was not impeded as there was
none in the area at that hour. After several blocks, the officer activated his emergency lights, and pulled defendant off to the
side of the road.
[1,2] There is no question that the police officer's stop of defendant was a "seizure" subject to the fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution. Therefore,
it can be justified only upon a showing of
reasonable suspicion that defendant had
committed or was committing a crime or
that he was stopped incident to a traffic
offense. Sierra at 975. In making that
determination, we ask whether from the
facts apparent to the officer and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, he
would reasonably suspect that defendant
was intoxicated as he drove down the
street. State v. Bavi, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216
(Utah App.1988), and cases cited therein.
This suspicion must be based upon articulated, "objective facts" then apparent to
the officer. Cf. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d
506 (Utah App.1988. r
The officer testified that he suspected
defendant was intoxicated because at 1:30
a.m. he drove slowly in the inside lane, and
because he stopped alongside the officer's
car and failed to "immediately" move on
when signaled to do so by the officer.
While this conduct may be indicative of a
drunken driver when combined with other
factors, the officer also agreed that it is
equally consistent with the habits and conduct of a normal driver. There is nothing
inherently untoward in a driver traveling
under the speed limit or in stopping momentarily, whether out of normal curiosity
or possibly even to observe whether assistance might have been required at 1:30 in

SANDY CITY v. THORSNESS
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the morning with no other people or traffic intoxicated. See State v. Chancellor, 704
in the area.
P.2d 579 (Utah 1985), and cases cited therein.
But, even so, these dangers are not
[3] Defendant did not engage in reckproperly
alleviated by permitting traffic
less, erratic driving patterns that indicated
stops
and
arrests on the basis of evidence
a lack of vehicle control or violated a traffic ordinance. While there may be a multi- as meager as that offered in this case.
tude of factors that objectively indicate the Our decision should not deter the enforceintoxication of a driver we do not believe ment of drunk driving laws when traffic
that the driving behavior in this case rea- stops and arrests are predicated on at least
sonably supports the suspicion of drunk a reasonable, articulated suspicion that an
driving. Although the officer testified that accused is intoxicated.
defendant's slower driving speed and his
Reversed and remanded.
failure to "move on immediately" when
requested on a deserted street at 1:30 a.m.
were indicia of intoxication, these facts are
All concur.
equally indicative of innocent behavior and,
without more, do not provide a reasonable
I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,
5>
basis to suspect defendant of being intoxicated. Cf. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976.
We are sensitive to the dangers posed in
our communities by those who drive while
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ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, SHERIFF
CSHTIOBARI TO THE SUPREME COUBT OP FLOBIDA
No. 70-5013, Argued December 6, 1971~Reamied Febnmrv 28.
1972—Decided June 12, 1972
The tight of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon y. Wainwright, 372 TJ. S. 335, is not governed by the classification of the
offense or by whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused,
may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prose-,
cation, whether feiony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied
die assistance QI counsel, in una case, tae Supreme Court of
Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who was tried
for an offense punishable by imprisonmrnt up to six months, a
SltQQQ fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence, had no right
to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the right ertends
only to triais "for non-oetty offm« prnwhable bv more than six
months imprisonment." Pp. 27-40,
236 So. 2d 442, reversed
Dotraus, J., delivered the opinion of the Cotnt, in which Brac?3fA2f, SITWART, W H H I , MARSHALL, and BLAOorra", JJ., joined.
BRSNHAX, J., filed & concurring opinion, in which DOUGLAS and
SrrwrAST, JJ-, joined, pott, p. 40. Btnjcra, C. J n filed an opinion
concurring in the result, post, p. 41. POWELL, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the result, in which RSHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 44.

Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioner on the
reargument and /. Michael Shea argued the cause pro
hoc vice on the original argument. With them on the
brief was P. A. Hubbart..
George R. Georgiefi, Assistant Attorney General of
Florida-, reargued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Robert L, Shewn, Attorney General,
and Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorney General,
joined by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Gary K. Nelson of Arizona, Arthur K.

OCTOBER TEEM, 1971

26

Opinion of the Court

407 U. S.

Bolton of Georgia, W. Anthony Park of Idaho, Jack P.
F. Gremillion of Louisiana, James S. Erwin of Maine,
Robert L. Woodahl of Montana, Robert List of Nevada,
Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of
North Dakota, and Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina.
Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae on the reargument urging
reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney
General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General Greenawalt,
Harry R. Sachse, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M.
Glazer.
Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by
William E. Hellerstein for the Legal Aid Society of New
York, and^by Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association.
Lauren Beasley, Chief Assistant Attorney General of
Utah, filed a brief for the Attorney General of Utah as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amid curiae were filed by John E. Havelock,
Attorney General, for the State of Alaska, and by Andrew
P. Miller, Attorney General, and Vann H. Lefcoe, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS

delivered the opinion of the

Court.
Petitioner, an indigent, was charged in Florida with
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000 fine, or both. The
trial was to a judge, and petitioner was unrepresented by
counsel He was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail, and
brought this habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme
Court, alleging that, being deprived of hisrightto counsel,
he was unable as an indigent layman properly to raise and
present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses to
the charge for which he stands convicted. The Florida

ARGERSDTGER v. HAMLIN
25

27

Opinion of the Court

Supreme Court by a four-to-three decision, in ruling on
the right to counsel, followed the line we marked out in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 TJ. S. 145, 159, as respects the
right to trial by jury and held that the right to courtappointed counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty
offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment." 236 So. 2d 442, 443.1
The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which
we granted. 401 U. S. 908. We reverse.
The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations
€ has been made applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment/see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra;
Washington v. Texas, 388 TJ. S. 14; Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U. S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 TJ. S. 400;
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 TJ. S. 335; and In re Oliver,
333 TJ. S. 257), provides specified standards for "all
criminal prosecutions."
1

For a survey of the opinions of judges, prosecutors, and defenders
concerning the right to counsel of persons charged with misdemeanors, see 1 L. SUverstein, Defense of the Poor in Cnminal Cases
in American State Courts 127-135 (1965).
A review of federal and state decisions following Gideon is contained in Comment, Eight to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v.
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970).
Twelve States provide counsel for indigents accused of "serious
crime" in the misdemeanor category. Id., at 119-124.
Nineteen States provide for the appointment of counsel in most
misdemeanor cases. Id., at 124-133. One of these is Oregon, whose
Supreme Court said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100101, 458 P. 2d 414, 418. "If our objective is to insure a fair trial
in every criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not determined by the seriousness of the crime. The assistance of counsel
wiii best avoid conviction of the innocent—an objective as in>
portant m tne municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction."
Uaiilorma'a requirement extends to traffic violations. Blake v.
'Muma-pal Court, 242 Cai. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771.
Overall, 31 States have now extended the right to defendants
charged with crimes less serious than felonies. Comment, Right
to Counsel, supra, at 134.
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One is the requirement of a "public trial." In re
Oliver, supra, held that the right to a "public trial"
was applicable to a state proceeding even though only
a 60-day sentence was involved. 333 U. S., at 272.
Another guarantee is the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation. Still another, the
right of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, supra. And
another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
one's favor. Washington v. Texas, supra. We .have
never limited these rights to felonies * or to lesser but
serious offenses.
In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have
held that due process requires that the accused have
the assistance of counsel for his defense, that he be
confronted with the witnesses against him, and that he
have the right to a speedy and public trial." 388 U. S.,
at 18. Respecting the right to a speedy and public
trial, the right ' to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, the right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, it was recently stated, "It is simply
not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial
of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice
to the accused of the charges, or that in such cases the
defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf."
Junker, The Eight to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases,
43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 705 (1968).
.District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, illustrates the point. There, the offense was engaging without a license in the business of dealing in second-hand
property, an offense punishable by a fine of $300 or
imprisonment for not more than 90 days. The Court
held that the offense was a "petty" one and could be
tried without a jury. But the conviction was reversed
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and a new trial ordered, because the trial court had prejudicially restricted the right of cross-examination, a right
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment by reason of the Fourteenth, was
limited by Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, to trials where
the potential punishment was imprisonment for six
months or more. But, as the various opinions in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, make plain, the right to
trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded
with a system of trial to a judge alone. As stated in
Duncan:
"Providing an accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect
a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge
or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in
other respects, found expression in the criminal law
in this insistence upon community participation in
the determination of guilt or innocence. The deep
commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial
in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection uuclcr
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the
States." 391 U. S„ at 156.
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While there is historical support for limiting the
"deep commitment" to trial by jury to "serious criminal cases,"2 there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel:
"Originally, in England, a person charged with
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel,
except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time
parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of
counsel. . . .
•

•

•

•

«

"[It] appears that in at least twelve of the
thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right
to counsel fuHy recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right
was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious
crimes . . . ." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45., 60,
64r-65.
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to
counsel bevond its enmmon-kw dimensions.

But there

is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history,
or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was
intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty
offenses wherein the common law previously did require
that counsel be provided. , See James v. Headley, 410
F. 2d 325, 331-332, n. 9.
We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than
'See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917,980982 (1926); James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 331. Cf..Kaye, Petty
Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 T7. Chi. L. Rev. 245 (1959).
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six months may be tried without a jury, they may also
be tried without a lawyer.
The assistance of counsel is often a reauisite to the
very existence of a fair triaL The Court in PoweU v.
Alabama, supra, at 68-69—a capital case—said:
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it.did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how
much more True is it of the ignorant and illiterate,
or those of feeble intellect."
In Gideon v. Wavnwrigkt, wpra (overruling Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial.
But we did not so limit the need of the accused for a
lawyer. We said:
"Tlln our adversary - system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and fed-
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eral, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderiy society. Similarly, there are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present
their defenses. That government hires lawyers to
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of
the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant
stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime

has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him » 372 TT. S.. at 344.'
Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their
rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an
accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon
suggest that there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal prosecutions, even those, such
• See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 TJ. S. 458, 462-463:
"[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution
is [re] presented by experienced and learned counsel. That- which is
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman
may appear intricate, complex and mysterious."
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as In re Oliver, supra, where the penalty is 60 days'
imprisonment:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
rrprpwnreil

hy

rf»,<n*t>l»

3 3 3 TT S

at 9 7 3

(ATTI-

phasis supplied).
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary
for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We
are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period axe any less complex
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more.
See, e. g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514; Thompson v.
Louisville, 362 U. S. 199; Skuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
382 U. S. 87.
The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only
brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the
cases often bristle with thorny constitutional questions.
See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156.
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, dealt with juvenile delinquency and an offense which, if committed by an
adult, would have carried a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months (id., at 29),
but which when committed by a juvenile might lead
to his detention in a'state institution until he reached
the age of 21. Id., at 36-37. We said (id., at 36) that
"[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it. The child 'requires the guiding hand of coun-
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sel at every step in the proceedings against him,' " citing
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 69. The premise of
Gault is that even in prosecutions for offenses less serious
than felonies, a fair trial may require the presence of a
lawyer.
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of
the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so
that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so
that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or
prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases,4 far
greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create
an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result. The Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128
(1967), states:
'Tor example, until legislation last year increased
the number of judges, the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions had four judges to process
the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony
cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000
petty offenses and an equal number of traffic offenses per year. An inevitable consequence of
volume that large is the almost total preoccupa4

In 1965, 314,000 defendants were charged with felonies in state
courts, and 24,000 were charged with felonies in federal courts.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 55 (1967). Exclusive of
traffic offenses, however, it is estimated that there are annually
between four and five million court cases involving misdemeanors.
Ibid. And, while there are no authoritative figures, extrapolations
indicate that there are probably between 403 and 50 million traffic
offenses each year. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right
to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1261 (1970).
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tion in such a court with the movement of cases.
The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for
care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise
too often is substituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual
defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting
the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he presents, or determining how to deal with him after
conviction. The frequent result is futility and failure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed:
" 'Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he
finds great numbers of defendants being processed
by harassed and overworked officials. Police have
more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors
walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they
take their initial looks at the files. Defense lawyers appear having had no more than time for
hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face
long calendars with the certain knowledge that their
calendars tomorrow and the next day will be, if
anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to
dispose of the cases.
" 'Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the crfmina.1 process, there is scant regard,
for them as individuals. They are numbers on
dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on.
their way. The gap between the theory and the
reality is enormous.
" Tery little such observation of the administration of criminal justice in operation is required to
reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills.' "
That picture ia seen in almost every report. "The
TmBripmeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and,
frequently irresponsible preparation on the part of the
defense, the prosecution, and the court. Everything is
rush, TUSEL" neilerstein, Tne importance of the Mis-
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demeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid
Bnei Uase 151, 152 (1970),
There is evidence of the prejudice which results to
misdemeanor defendants from this "assembly-line justice." One study concluded that "fmlisdemeanants represented bv attorneys are five times as likely to emerge
from police court with all charges dismissed as are
defendants who face similar charges without counsel/1
American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970).,
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty 5 offenses often
5

Title 18 U. S. C. § 1 defines a petty offense as one in which the
penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, or a fine of
not more than $500, or both. Title IS U. S. C. § 3006A (b) provides
for the appointment of counsel for indigents in all cases "other than
a petty offense." But, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted in James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d, at 330-331, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3006A, which was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, contains a congressional plan for furnishing legal representation at federal
expense for certain indigents and does not purport to cover the full
range of constitutional rights to counsel.
Indeed, the Conference Report on the Criminal Justice Act of
1964 made clear the conferees' belief that the right to counsel extends to ail offenses, petty and serious alike, EL R. Conf. Rep.
No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess* (1964).
In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. aa_
ammded in 1966, provide in Rule 44 (a): f'Every defendant who
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel
assigned to represent Iran at every stage of the" proceedings from
his initial appearance before the commi^r*^ nr the court through
appeal, unless he waives such appointment."
The Advisory Committee note on Ruie 44 says: "Like the original
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader
in two respects than that for which: compensation is provided in the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964:
"(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the
district courts, and
"(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel _
for reasons other than financial."

ARGERSINGEIL v. HAMLIN
25

37

Opinion of the Court

require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a
fair trial. MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that these
problems are raised even in situations where there is no
prospect of imprisonment. Post, at 48. We need not
consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not
involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York,
399 U. S., at 73. "the prospect of imprisonment for
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result
in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation."'
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.7
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with
which we agree. It said in Stevenson v. Holzrnan, 254
Ore. 94, 102, 458 P. 2d 414, 418:
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his
•See Manton v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (ED Va. 1971):
"Any incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually
result in loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment
to the defendant and his family."
T
We do not share MR. JTTSTXCB POWELL'S doubt that the Nation's
legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule we announce
today. It has been estimated that between 1,575 and 2,300 M-timc
counsel would-be required to represent ail indigent misdemeanants,
excluding traffic offenders. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded
Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These
figures are relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated
355200 attorneys in the United States (Statistical Abstract of the
United States 153 (1971)), a number which is projected to double
by the year 1985. See Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146,147. Indeed, there are 18,000 new admissions to the bar each year—3,500 more lawyers than arc required
to fill the "estimated 14^500 average annual openings." Id., at 14S.
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liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will
preclude the imposition of a jail sentence/' *
We do not sit; as an ombudsman to direct state courts
how to manage their affairs but only to make clear the
federal constitutional requirement. How crimes should
be classified is largely a state matter.9 The fact that
traffic charges technically fall within the category of
"criminal prosecutions" does not necessarily mean that
many of them will be brought into the class 10 where imprisonment actually occurs.
8

Article I, § 9, of the proposed Revised Constitution of Oregon
provides:
''Every person has the right to assistance of counsel in all official
proceedings and dealings with public officers that may materially
affect him. If he cannot afford counsel, he has the right to have
counsel appointed for him in any case in which he may lose his
liberty."
9
One partial solution to the problem of minor offenses may well
be to remove them from the court system. The American Bar Association Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control recently recommended, inter o&x, that:
"Regulation of various types of conduct which harm no one other
than those involved (e. g., public drunkenness, narcotics addiction,
vagrancy, and deviant sexual behavior) should be taken out of the
courts. Tfle handling of these matters should be transferred to nonjudiaal entities, sucfa as detoxincation centers, narcotics treatment
centers and social service agencies. The handling of other aonsenous offenses, such as housing code and traffic violations, should „
oe transierred to specialized administrative bodies/' A3A Report,.
iNew -Perspectives on Urban Crime hr- (1972). Such a solution, of
course, is peculiarly within the province of state and local legislatures,
10
"Forty thousand traffic charges (arising out of 150,000 nonparking traffic citations) were disposed of by court action in Seattle
during 1964. Ite-gtudv showed, howsw, t.w, fa pnly Tihmit 1,iiff\_
cases was there any possibility of imprisonment as the result of a^
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The American Bar Association Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice states:
"As a matter of sound judicial administration it
is preferable to disregard the characterization of the
offense as felony, misdemeanor or traffic offense.
Nor is it adequate to require the provision of defense
services for all offenses which carry a sentence to
jail or prison. Often, as a practical matter, such
sentences are rarely if ever imposed for certain types
of offenses, so that for all intents and purposes the
punishment they carry is at most a fine. Thus, the
standard seeks to distinguish those classes of cases
in which there is real likelihood that incarceration
may follow conviction from those types in which
there is no such likelihood. It should be noted that
the standard does not recommend a determination
of the need for counsel in terms of the facts of each
particular case; it draws a categorical line at those
types of offenses for which incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility." Providing Defense
Services 40 (Approved Draft 1968).
traffic conviction. In onlv thrce.Jrinds--.nf- cases was the accused
exposed to any danger of imprisonment: (1) where the offense
Jcnafgea was nit-and-run, reciciess or drunken driving; or (2) wher^"
jay aaditiSBF^ranic violation was charged against an individual"
subject to a suspended sentence for a previous violation: or
(Sy'^n^l^wnaTev^nBe^Sense^na^^^S'e convicted individuaT
waanngfllA m p»^y"T5?^5r"mipose<l." Junker. The Eight to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev, 885, 711 (196£
~
Of the 1,288,975 people convicted by the Uty of iNew York in
1970 for traffic infractions such as jaywalking and speeding, only
24 were fined and imprisoned, given suspended sentences, or jailed.
Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Report 11 (1970).
Of the 19,187 convicted of more serious traffic offenses, such as
driving under the influence, reckless driving, and leaving the scene
of an accident, 404 (2.1%) were subject to some form of imprisonment. Ibid.
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Under the rule we announce today, every judge will
J<;-nnw whpn t.h<» trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
•irpppgnnment maybe imposed, even though local law
permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel?*
He will nave a measure oi the seriousness and gravity^
oi the offeiiSKi alld (JmrHfUrB kIMw when to name a lawyer
to represent the accused before the trial starts.
The run oi misdemeanors will not be anected by
today's ruling. But in those that end up in the actual
deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive
the benefit of "the guiding hand of counsel" so necessary
when one's liberty is in jeopardy.
Reversed.
M B . JUSTICE BHENKAN, with whom
DOUGLAS and Ma. JUSTICE STEWART join,

Ms. JUSTICE
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court and add only an
observation upon its discussion of legal resources, ante,
at 37 n. 7. Law students as well as practicing attorneys
may provide an important source of legal representation
for the indigent. The Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) informs us that
more than 125 of the country's 147 accredited law schools
have established clinical programs in which facultysupervised students aid clients in a variety of civil and
criminal matters.* CLEPR Newsletter, May 1972, p. 2.
These programs supplement practice rules enacted in
38 States authorizing students to practice law under
prescribed conditions. Ibid, Like the American Bar
Association's Model Student Practice Rule (1969), most
of these regulations permit students to make supervised
*A total of 57 law schools have also established clinical programs
in corrections, where law students, under faculty supervision, aid
prisoners in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief.
CLEPR Newsletter, May 1972, p. 3. See United'States v. Simpson,
141 U. S. App. D. C. 8, 15-16, 436 F. 2d 162, 169-170 (1970).
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court appearances as defense counsel in criminal cases.
CLEPR, State Rules Permitting the Student Practice of
Law: Comparisons and Comments 13 (1971). Given the
huge increase in law school enrollments over the past
few years, see Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146 (1972), I think it plain that
law students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases
reached by today's decision.
concurring in the result.
I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of
the Court and with Ma. JUSTICE POWELL'S appraisal
of the problems. Were I able to confine my focus solely
to the burden that the States will have to bear in providing counsel, I would be inclined, at this stage of
the development of the constitutional right to counsel,
to conclude that there is much to commend drawing
the line at penalties in excess of six months' confinement.
Yet several cogent factors suggest the infirmities in any
approach that allows confinement for any period without the aid of counsel at trial; any deprivation of liberty,
is a serious matter. The issues that must be dealt with
in a trial for a petty offense or a misdemeanor may often
be simpler than those involved in a felony trial and
yet oe peyond the capability of a layman, especially
when he is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There .
is little ground, therefore, to assume that a defendant,
unaided by counsel, will be any more able adequately
to defend himself against the lesser charges that may
involve confinement than more serious charges. Appeal
from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely
to be of much help to a defendant since the die is usually
cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial
record.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BUBGEB,
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Trial judges sitting in petty and misdemeanor cases—
and prosecutors—should recognize exactly what will be
required by today's decision. Because no individual can
be imprisoned unless he is represented by counsel, the
trial judge and the prosecutor will have to engage in
a predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether
there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant
is convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail
term. The judge can preserve the option of a jail sentence only by offering counsel to any defendant unable
to retain counsel on his own. This need to predict
will place a new load on courts already overburdened
and already compelled to deal with far more cases in
one day man is reasonable and proper. Yet the prediction is not one beyond the capacity of an experienced
judge, aided as he should be by the prosecuting officer.
As to jury cases, the latter should be prepared to inform
tne judge as to any prior record of the accused, the .
general nature oi the case against the accused, including any use of violence, the severity of harm to the
victim, the impact on the community, and the other
factors relevant to the sentencing process. Since, the
judge ought to have some degree of such information
after judgment of guilt is determined, ways can be found
in the more serious misdemeanor cases when jury trial
is not waived to make it available to i the judge before
trials This will not mean a full "presentence" report
on every defendant in every case before the jury passes
on guilt, but a prospmtor shonlH know before trial
whether he intends to urge a jail sentence, and if he
does he should be prepared to aid the court with the
factual and legal basis for his view on that score.
*In a nonjury case the prior record of the accused should not
be made known to the trier of fact except by way of traditional
impeachment.
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This will mean not only that more defense counsel
must be provided, but also additional prosecutors and
better facilities for securing information about the accused as it bears on the probability of a decision to confine.
The step we take today should cause no surprise to
the legal profession. More than five years ago the profession, speaking through the American Bar Association
in a Report on Standards Relating to Providing Defense
Services, determined that sorietVs goal should be
"that the system for providing counsel and facilities
for the defense be as good as the system which society
provides for the prosecution." American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice. Providing Defense Services 1 (Approved Draft 1968). The
ABA was not addressing itelf, as we must in this case, to
the constitutional requirement but onlv to the broad
policy issue. Elsewhere in the Report the ABA stated
that:
"The fundamental premise of these standards is
that representation by counsel is desirable in criminal cases both from the viewpoint of the defendant
and of society." Id., at 3,.
After considering the same general factors involved in
the issue we decide today, the ABA Report specifically
concluded that:
"Counsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable bv loss of liberty.
except those types of offenses for which such punishment is not likely to beimposed. regardless
oi their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or
otherwise." Id., § 4.1, pp. 37-38.

In a companion ABA Report on Standards Relating to
the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function
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the same basic theme appears in the positive standard
cast in these terms:
"Counsel for the accused is an essential component
of the administration of criminal justice. A court
properly constituted to hear a criminal case must
be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the
judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for
the prosecution, and counsel for the accused." Id.,
at 153 (Approved Draft 1968).
The right to counsel has historically been an evolving
concept. The constitutional requirements with respect
to the issue have dated in recent times from Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), to Gideon v: Wainwright,
372 TJ. S. 335 (1963). Part of this evolution has been
expressed in the policy prescriptions of the legal profession itself, and the contributions of the organized
bar and individual lawyers—such as those appointed to
represent the indigent defendants in the Powell and
Gideon cases—have been notable. The holding of the
Court today may well add large new burdens on a
profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the
profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed
on it.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom ME. JUSTICE R E H N QUIST joins, concurring in the result.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), held that
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all
indigent defendants charged with felonies.1 The ques1

While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
is Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice H.irian was quick to
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 TJ. S., at
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed
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tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punishment of six months' imprisonment, a fine of $1,000,
or both, and sentenced to 90 days in jail, is entitled as
a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of appointed counsel. The broader question is whether the
Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged
with a state petty offense2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel.
In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that indigents charged with serious misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.1
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
145 (1968), and in the subsequent case of Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), which was decided
shortly after the opinion below, in which the Court held
that the due process right to a trial by jury in state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the offense
charged was punishable by more than six months' imprisonment. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel
line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor
cases. See In re Gauit, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mem-pa v. Rhay,
389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 114
(1967); Leper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972).
2
As used h»wmt the term "petty offense" means any offense where
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses
not punishable by imprisonment, regardless of the amount of any
fine that might be authorized. To this extent, the definition used
herein differs from the federal statutory dehnition of "petty offense," which includes offenses punishable by not more than six
months' imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding $500. IS U. S. C.
§1.
• 236 So. 2d 442 (1970).
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has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there
is a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled lavman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial
before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of.
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless.
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the
offense charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin,
and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 TJ. S. 617
(1937), reveal that the jury-trial limitation has historic
origins at common law. No such history exists to support a similar limitation of the right to counsel; to the
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was available in misdemeanor but not in felonv cases.4 Onlv as
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover,
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a jury—tempering the possibly
arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial
powers—while important, is not as fundamental to the
guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.8
•See Powell •. Alabama, 2S7 TJ. S. 45, 60-51 (1932).
' 'Dvncan v. Lomriana, 391 TJ. S. 145, 156 (1968).
• Although we have given retroactive effect to our ruling hi
Gideon, Pickebimer v. Wamwright, 375 TJ. S. 2 (1963), we have
said that, "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woodx, 392 U. S.
631, 634 (1968).
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I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a pettyoffense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. Nor nan I agree with the
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court,
that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
mav be imprisoned . . . unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial." Ante, at 37. It seems to me that
the line should not be drawn with such rigidity.
There is a middle course, between the extremes of
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right
to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial.
I
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Alabama1 and Gideon* both of which involved felony
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately their own cases, much less identify and
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will
also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not oe tairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by
counseL jEven in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some other handicapr will
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief
period served under the sometimes deplorable con1

Supra, a. 4, At 68-$9.
•372 U.S., at 343-345.
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ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal
reword on emplovabilitv. are frequently of sufficient mag- .
nitude not to be casually dismissed by the label "petty." 9
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may
attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run
escapade.10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell
v. Byrson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioners case,"]
their continued possession may become essential in j
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued j
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates j
important interests of the licensees. In such cases
the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth
| Amendment." Id., at 539.
When the deprivation of property rights and interests is
of sufficient consequence." denying the assistance of<
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due process.
'See 1 L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in
American State Courts 132 (1965).
"See James v. Seadley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969).
u
A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State ex rel. Stinger
v. Kruger, 280 Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919)), disqualification for a
licensed profession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (1962) (optometrists); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 93A-4.(b) (1965) (real estate brokers)),
and loss of pension rights (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (1966) (police
disability pension denied when injury is result of participation in
fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Ind.
Ann, Stat. § 28-4616 (1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor resulting in imprisonment); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 53, §39323 (Supp.
1972-1973) and §65599 (1957) (conviction of crime or misdemeanor)). See generally Project, The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970).
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This is not to say that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assessment of the possible consequences of conviction is the
sole test for the need for assistance of counsel. The
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances.
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process,
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While
counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no
means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are
complex; others are exceedingly simple.' As a justification for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries." 12 Yet government often does
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the
arresting police officer presents the aase. W>r HOPS mem
defendant who can afford to do so hire lawyers to defend
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs
oi assistance oi counsel may exceed the benefits.13 It
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend
13

Gideon v. Wainvmght, 372 TJ. S., at 344.
" I n petty offenses, there is much less plea negotiation than in
serious offenses. See Report by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge oi
Crime in a Free Society (hereinafter Challenge) 134 (1967). Thus,
in cases where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the assistance
of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence.
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the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exercised by nonindigent defendants.
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not
so classified, yet who are in low-income groups where
engaging counsel in a minor petty-offense case would
be a luxury the family could not affnrri. T>IP ling between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from
State to State and often resulting in serious inequities to
accused persons. The Courts new rule will accent the
disadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically
A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are
tried showed that procedures were often informal, presided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the
prosecution was not vigorous.14 It is as inaccurate to
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel if the
offense charged is only a petty one.18
Deroite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would h*
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be
i4

SEverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
"Neither the Report by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice nor the American Bar
Association went the route the Court- takes today. The President's
Commission recommended that counsel be provided for criminal defendants who face "a significant penalty" and at least to those who are
in danger of "substantial loss of liberty." Challenge, ittpra, n. 13, at
150. The American Bar Association standard would not extend the
right to counsel to cases where "loss of liberty" is not "likely to be
imposed," American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services 37-40 (Approved Draft
1968). Neither supports a new, inflexible constitutional rule.
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applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms
of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan
centers.
Th» miffflHnptPfjtodaydoes not go all the way. It
i« TiTrntPri tn patty-offense cases in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's position indicates, however, that when the decision must
be made, the rule will be extended to ail petty-offense
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations.
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need
for counsel if a jail sentence is imposed, one must assume a similar rejection of discretion in other pettyoffense cases. It would be illogical—and without discernible support in the Constitution—to hold that no
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty-offense
cases which may result in far more serious consequences
than a few hours or days of incarceration.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken
from a person without affording him due process of law.
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis
for distinguishing, between .deprivations. .oQberty^ and
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at
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all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "nonjail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences.
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact
upon the day-to-day functioning of the aiminal justice
system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitutional rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, especially since it is supported neither by history
nor precedent.

n

The majority opinion concludes that, absent a valid
waiver, a person may not be imprisoned even for lesser
oflenses unless he was represented by counsel at the trial.
In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned—
however briefly—unless he was represented by, or waived
his right to, counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren
of details as to how this rule will be implemented.
There are thousands of statutes and ordinances, which
autnonze imprisonment for six months or less, usually
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spitting on the sidewalk to certain- traffic offenses. They
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors.
This broad spectrum of petty-offense cases daily floods
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today
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will confront the judges of each of these courts
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed
or toowmgjv waived, QQ sentence of imprisonment
for any duration may be"~imposed, The judge will
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial—
and without hearing the evidence—whether he will
forgo entirely hi3 judicial discretion to impose some
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility
to consider the full range of punishments established
by tne legislature. His alternatives, assuming the
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel
and retain the discretion vested in him bv law, or to
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without
counsel.
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice requires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tailored to fit the crime and the individual would have
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the
new rule, judges will be tempted arbitrarily to divide
petty offenses into two categories—those for which sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the
statutory authorization. In creating categories of offenses which by law are imprisonable but for which
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge will be
overruling de facto the legislative determination as to
the appropriate range of punishment for the particular offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a
valuable deterrent purpose. At least the legislatures,
and until today the courts, have viewed the threat of
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imprisonment—even when rarely carried out—as serving

N

a legitimate social function.

Jt>

Tn the brief for the United States as amicus curiae,
9
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility Q^A
could be preserved through the technique of trial de novo J
if the evidence—contrary to pretrial assumptions—jus^
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered.
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a *pf»nnH
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could make use of evidence which came out at
the first trial when the accused was uncounseled. If
the second trial were held before the same judge, he
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might ran
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in
jeopardy for the same offense.18 In all likelihood, there
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by
legislatures as imprisonabie, will be treated by judges
as unimpnsonable.
The new rule announced today also could result in
equal protection problems. There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual defendants,
depending on whether the individual judge has determined in advance to leave open the option of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the
same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which
no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this type of
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.
"See CaUan v. TTfcon, 127 XT. S. 540 (1888);*North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 T7. S. 711 (1969).
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A different type of discrimination could result in the
typical petty-offense case where judgment in the alternative is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no imprisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who
can pay a $100 fine, and does so,' will have responded
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents.17
To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by
lawr most judges are liTcwIy tn appoint cnnnspl for indigents in all but the most minnr nffenses where iail

sentences are extremely rare. It is doubtful that the
States possess the necessary resources to meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States
tae rule the Court today adopts, recognized that the
consequences could be far reaching. In addition to the
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement of defense counsel will "require more
pre-trial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time, and
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel.
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and
they are one of our worst bottlenecks."18
1T

The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary
alternative of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairness—
both to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971). No adequate
resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found.
The rule adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of
all discretion in such cases unless counsel is available and is appointed,
could aggravate the problem.
if
Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35;
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After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases:
"[I]f . . . this Court's decision should become fully
applicable on the day it is announced, there could
be a massive pileup in the state courts which do
not now meet this standard. This would involve
delays and frustrations which would not be a real
contribution to the administration of justice."19
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regarding the extraordinary demand for counsel which
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that type" could be used
"as counsel in certain types of cases involving relatively
small sentences." " Quite apart from the practical and
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50
States which require a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is
not reassuring. In a footnote, it is said that there are
presently 355,200 attorneys and that the number will
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel,
estimated by one source at between 1,575 and 2,300, to
represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic
"/<*., at 36-37.
*»/<*., at 39.
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offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 355,200
lawyers axe potentially available. Thousands of these
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice
work for governments, corporate legal departments, or the
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal representation. Of those in general practice, we have no
indication how many are qualified to defend criminal
cases or willing to accept assignments which may prove
less than lucrative for most.21
It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementation of the Court's new rule will require no more than
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few communities
are there full-time public defenders available for, or private lawyers specializing in, petty cases. Thus, if it were
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the
schedules of those lawyers who are willing to take an
21

The custom in many, if not most, localities is to appoint counsel
on a case-by-case basis. Compensation is generally inadequate.
Even in the federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which provides one of the most generous compensation plans, the rates for appointed counsel—$20 per hour spent
out of court, $30 per hour of court time, subject to a maximum total
fee of $400 for a misdemeanor case and $1,000 for a felony—are low
by American standards. Consequently, the majority of persons
willing to accept appointments are the young and inexperienced.
See Cappeiletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, in
Cappelletti <fe Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations,
24 Stan. L. Rev. 347, 377-378 (1972). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN
suggests, in his concurring opinion, that law students might provide
an important source of legal representation. He presents no figures,
however, as to how many students would be qualified and willing
to undertake the responsibilities of defending indigent misdemeanants. Although welcome progress is being made with programs,
supported by the American Bar Association, to enlist the involvement of law students in indigent representation, the problems of
meeting state requirements and of assuring the requisite control
and supervision, are far from insubstantial. Moreover, the impact
of student participation would be limited primarily to the 140 or
less communities where these law schools are located.
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occasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded
calendars of lower courts in which cases are not scheduled
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate
figures ignores the heart of the problem, which is the
distribution and availability of lawyers, especially in the
hundreds of small localities across the country.
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's
holding will be on our already overburdened local
courts.22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The
Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and congestion in these courts. We are familiar with the
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, often without due regard to its probable payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of
delay.53 The absence of direct economic impact on the
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in
petty-offense cases. The admirable zeal of these lawyers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time
their not yet crowded schedules permit them to devote
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for courtroom exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent constitutional explosion in procedural rights for the accused—all these factors are likely to result in the stretch"See generally H. James, Crisis in the Courts, c. 2 (1968);
Challenge, ntpra, n. 13, at 145-156.
28
See, «. g., James, swpra, n. 22, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971).
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs
to the public and added delay and congestion in the
courts.5*
There is an additional problem. The ability of various States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely.
Even if there were adequate resources on a national
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources—of lawyers, of facilities, and available funding—presents the
most acute problem. A number of state courts have
considered the question before the Court in this case,
and have been compelled to confront these realities.
Many, have concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so,
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further."
J* In Cook County, Illinois, a recent study revealed that the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense
of Prisoners who are appointed to represent indigent defendants elect
a jury trial in 63% of their trial cases, while other appointed counsel
and retained counsel do so in 33% and the public defender in only 15%.
"One possible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel,
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, are more
willing to undertake a jury trial than is an assistant public defender,
who is very busy and very conscious of the probable extra penalty
accruing to a defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks
& W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent 159
(1968) (footnote omitted).
"See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala, App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967);
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969);
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 534 (1967); State ex
reL Argeninger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v.
Dupree, 42 DL 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mailory,
378 Men. 538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle,
76 Wash. 2d 142,.456 P. 2d 696 (1969), cert, denied, 397 U. S. 948
(1970); State ex rei. PluUehack v. Department of Health and Social
Service*, 37 Wis. 2d 713,155 N. W. 2d 549 (1968).
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In other States, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of
that adopted by the majority." These cases and statutes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures
of many States, which understand the problems of
local judicial systems better than this Court, that
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously
overtax capabilities.27
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for a
writ of certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the municipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972,
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota,
"See Hawaii Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code §§ 19-851,
19-852 (Supp. 1971); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-4503 (Supp. 1971); Ky.
Rule Crim. Proc. 8.04; La. Rev. Stat. § 15:141 (F) (1967); Me. Rule
Crim. Proc. 44; Md. Rule 719b2 (a); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-1803
(1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.188, 193.140 (1969); N. Mex Stat.
Ann. § 41-22-3 (Supp. 1971); Utah Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (Supp.
1971); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503 (Supp. 1971); Va. Code Ann.
§19.1-241.1 (Supp. 1971).
"See TT.i«ii«i.y & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases.
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that
it be 'nothing.'" (Footnote omitted.) But see State v. Borst, 278
Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967).
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has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise
allocation of its limited resources.
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not
dissimilar to hundreds of communities in the United
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial resources, but with the need to have some sort of
local court system to deal with, minor offenses.28 It is
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates
while the more serious offenses are tried in a countywide court located in the county seat.:9 It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some.
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for
many small town courts. The community could simply
not enforce its own laws."
» See Cableion v. State, 243 Ark., at 358, 420 S. W. 2d, at 538539: "[T]here are more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there
are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which
there are no practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to counsel
in misdemeanor cases] would seriously impair the administration of
justice in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal
profession." (Footnote omitted.)
" See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126.
10
The successful implementation of the majority';* rule would
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States
with 21% of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 12C5
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000
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Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight
both to the likelihood of short-term "chaos" and to
the possibility of long-term adverse effects on the system.
The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the
guarantee of due process required the assistance of
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed
or that the only workable method of insuring justice
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay
in an already overburdened system, the majority's drawing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however
brief, the according of special constitutional status
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate
from the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless
the Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule.
Due process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the
six-month rule approved below nor .the rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result.
defending indigents in felony cases—up from $376,000 in 1969.
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was 3612,000, the legislature
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v.
Strange, No. 71-11, decided today, post, p. 128. "In view of American resources the funds spent on the legal services program can only
be regarded as trivial." Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at 379. "Although
the American economy is over S times the size of the British and the
American population is almost 4 times as great, American legal aid
expenditures are less than 2 times as high." Id., at 379 n. 210.
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m
I would hold that the right to counsel in pettyoffense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a. case-by-case basis." The determination
should be made before the accused formally pleads;
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas in
which the assistance of counsel may be required." If
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its
reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review.
The trial court would then become obligated to scrutinize
carefully the subsequent proceedings for the protection
of the defendant. If an unrepresented defendant sought
to enter a plea of guilty, the Court should examine
the case against him to insure that there is admissible
evidence tending to support the elements of the offense. I&a case went to trial without defense counsel,
th«» nnnrt should interveneri/nuiu. imccspary, '.u llimire
that the defendant adequately brmgs oil I tlitf Lnu in
his favor and to prevent legal issues fl'imi being uveilooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly
against unrepresented defendants, finally, appellate
" I t seems to me that such an individualized rule, unlike a sixmonth rule and the majority's rule, does not present equal protection problems under this Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
TJ. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 TJ. S. 353 (1963); and
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 TJ. S. 1S9 (1971).
" See, e. q., Kate, Municipal Courts—Another Urban 111, 20 Case
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 TJ. S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 TJ. S. 59 (1963) ;
Sarvsy v. Mbnssippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965).
Although then is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. 13,
tupra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the defendant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt can
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial.
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courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to
appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow.
It is unpossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise
and detailed set of guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges
of traffic law infractions would rarely present complex
legal or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions,
• sucn as searcn-and-seizure prooiems, would usually be too
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense were
one where the State is represented by counsel and where
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel,
there would be a strong indication that the indigent also
needs the assistance of counsel.
Second, the court should consider the probable sentence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The
,more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted
in Fart 1 above, Imprisonment is not the only serious
consequence tne court should consider.
i'nird, tne court should consider the individual factors
peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the
most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be
the competency of the individual defendant to present his
own case. The attitude of the community toward a particular defendant or particular incident would be another
consideration. But there might be other reasons why a
defendant would have a peculiar need for a lawyer which
would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where
the court would normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges
would be crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental
, fairness requiring the consideration of the varying factors
in each case.

AJlGEHSINGEIt v. HAMLIN
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Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the specialcircumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333
U. S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon."
j ^ n p *f +h* rooenna for seeking a more definitive standard
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to
jive up to their responsibilities in determining on a caseby-case basis whether counsel should De appointed. See
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice ilarian in (Jiaeon,
372 U. S., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of fundamental fairness, there is little reason to think that insensitivity will abate.
TnftonrlnHinirI emphasize my long-held conviction
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly
only when all parties arc represented by competent
counsel. Before becoming a member ol this Lourt,~T
participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the availability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case,
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to
me—as it has to the other members of the Court. We
are all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right
to counsel, but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what
the Constitution requires, and (ii) the effect upon the
criminal justice system, especially in the snuil'.er cities
and the thousands of police, municipal, and justice of die
peace courts across the country.
The view I have expressed in this opinion would accord
considerable discretion to the courts, and would allow the
M

I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts; I am in complete
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to
counsel in a felony case. See n. 1, supra. Neither case controls
today's result.
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flexibility and opportunity for adjustment which seems
so necessary when we are imposing new doctrine on the
lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view
would not precipitate the "chaos" predicted by the Solicitor General as the probable result of the Courts absolutist
rule, there would still remain serious practical problems
resulting from the expansion of indigents' rights to counsel in petty-offense cases.J4 But the according of reviewable discretion to the courts in determining when counsel
is necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a completely inflexible rule, would facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider availability and use of defense counsel.
In this process, the courts of first instance which decide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider
the need for counsel in every case where the defendant
faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above,
and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as
might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or
rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The
goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that no person accused of crime
must stand alone if counsel is needed.
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the
result of the decision in this case.

34

Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in
this opinion will result from any raising of the standards as to the
requirement of counsel. It is my view that relying upon Judicial
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice is the
very courts which already are under the most severe strain.

ADDENDUM PART 8
DON R. KYNASTON
512 North 750 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF BOUNTIFUL CITY
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo

V
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*A >

BOUNTIFUL CITY,
MOTION FOR DESIGNATION
OF RECORDS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 902286

DON R. KYNASTON,
Appellant.
—

ooOoo

—

COMES NOW the Accused Don R. Kynaston and motions this Court for
Designation of Records pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Accused motions this Court to produce and provide to Don R. Kynaston
all the records concerning him, to enable the Accused to perfect his appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals, concerning the Accused's Affidavit of Prejudice
that the Accused has filed against Judge S. Mark Johnson.
The information requested shall include all police records of stops,
citations (Bill of Pains) and arrests of Don R. Kynaston.
This information shall also include the records of all trials, names of
trial judges, including pro-tem judges and all the verdicts rendered and also
all recorded tapes of these criminal actions, and the dates and times which
they were recorded.
This information from the Court records shall include when the Accused
Don R. Kynaston served jail or prison time and how much bail, bond, or fines
he paid to the Court.
back for ten years.

This information must go back and include everything

Also included must be all of the off-the-record conversations between
Judge S. Mark Johnson and the City Prosecutor and between Judge S. Mark
Johnson and the Court Clerks concerning the Accused.

Also, the Accused in the

above-numbered case motions that the city produce a Corpus Delicti, the name
of a person or persons who suffered injury or damage in this action, that they
be brought forth to testify against the Accused.
These records must be delivered to the Accused Don R. Kynaston within ten
(10) days of this Motion..
DATED this

/f)

day of September, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

DON R. KYNASTON
Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered^ true and correct copy of the
MOTION FOR DESIGNATION OF RECORDS t h i s / 2 ***
day of September, 1990.

Don R. Kyna'ston

/

F I L E D
SEP 10:930
SHAEON MOWER, C!e-k
Fourth Circuit Court
Bountiful Department

ADDENDUM PART 9

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DAVIS
LAYTON DEPARTMENT

BOUNTIFUL CITY,
Plaintiff,
D E C I S I O N
C i v i l No. 882003055

vs.
DON KYNASTON ,

Defendant.

The court finds that the defendant is indigent at the
present time and is entitled to the relief as set out in
Section 77-32-5 of the Utah Code.
Dated this

^

~~

day of May, 1989.

Parley R. Baldwii
Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to Bountiful City Prosecutor, at 745 South Main,
Bountiful, Utah, 84010, and to Don R, Kynaston, Defendant, at
512 North 750 East, Bountiful, Utah, 84010; postage prepaid
this
<ML^
day of May, 1989.

^

Debbie L.
Deputy Clerk

ADDENDUM PART 10
ABPENDOM

Federal Fule^ of C r i m i n a l

Procedure

No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1966, provide in Rule 44 (a): "Every defendant who
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel
assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from
his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through
appeal, unless he waives such appointment."
The Advisory Committee note on Rule 44 says: "Like the original
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader
in two respects than that for which compensation is provided in the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964:
a
(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the
district courts, and
"(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel
for reasons other than financial/9

WILLIAM T. S A D L E R , M.D.
P U L M O N A R Y , I N T E R N A L , A N D OCCUPATIONAL,
MEDICI NX
415 S O U T H MEDICAL DRIVE. SUITE C - 2 0 2
B O U N T I F U L . UTAH

8*OiO

295-8523

ADDENDUM PART U

September 20, 1990

To whom it may concern:
Re:

Donald R. Kynaston

I have attended Mr. Kynaston in Lakeview Hospital (9/11/90 thru
9/17/90) and briefly as an outpatient following his discharge. Mr.
Kynaston has evidence of a prior myocardial infarction (heart
attack) on his electrocardiogram. For several reasons including
financial constraints we were unable to complete the evaluation of
this problem while Mr. Kynaston was hospitalized. He has requested
that the remainder of his evaluation take place at the Salt Lake
City Veteran1s Administration Hospital and I am attempting to
schedule the rest of the evaluation there.
Mr. Kynaston!s chest pains may be due to unstable heart disease.
They are exacerbated by emotional stress and incarceration. An
additional heart attack may prove to be disabling and might be
fatal if it does occur.
I ffeel that postponement of his jail
sentence is warranted until his cardiac status can be fully
defined. Please contact me if I can be of assistance in this
matter. Best wishes.
Sincerely,

y-ld.Cil)

William T. Sadler, M.D.

WTS/ss
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DL # 14294417

Department of Public Safety
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES
Financial Responsibility Section
Third Floor South
4501 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119

A D D E N D U M P A R T I?
ORDER OF SUSPENSION
To Become Effective Unless
Security is Deposited or
An Exemption is Established
READ

CAREFULLY

zrr
Mr. Don R. Kynaston
512 North 750 East
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010

-d ti

FILE NO. 3 0 - 1 1 - 4 4 3 4 1 9

Dear Sir or Madam:
As a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on November 3 0 . 1984
,in or
near.
Bountjfyl
. ,Utah
,Utah you
you have
have become
become sub
subject to the security requirement
provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act, Chapter 12, Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Since you have not shown that you had automobile liability insurance in effect at the time of the accident, and since
you have not exempted yourself from the security requirement provisions of the Act in any of the other ways
permitted, the Department must now make the following Order:
Your privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State of Utah is suspended as of
June 2 5 , 1985
, UNLESS prior to that date you have done either of the following:
(1) Deposited security with the Department in the amount of $ 1 j 0 2 0 . 0 0
or
(2) Established an exemption from the requirement of depositing such security, or in any of the ways listed on the
reverse side of this Order.
Immediately after such effective date of this Order, if you have not by that time deposited such security or
established such an exemption, you must forward to the Department (address above) all operator's and chauffeur's
licenses evidencing your Utah driving privilege, and all Utah motor vehicle registration certificates and license plates
in your name. If you fail to do this, you will become subject to a fine not exceeding $299.00, or imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or both,
This Order, if allowed to become effective, will remain in effect until (1) you have deposited the above-stated amount
of secuirty, or (2) you have established an exemption from the requirement of depositing such security, in any of the
ways listed on the reverse side of this Order, or (3) one year has elapsed following the effective date of the suspension
order and evidence satisfactory to the Department is submitted to it indicating that within that period no action at law
arising out of the accident has been instituted against you, or if so instituted, that it is no longer pending.
DATE ORDER SIGNED:
June 5 ,

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Financial Responsibility Section

1985

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifes that, on the date below, he or she, as an employee of the Department of Public
Safety, Financial Responsibility Section, deposited in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, an original of
the order to which this is affixed, in an envelope addressed to the person named in the order, at his or her last address
as shown on the records of the Department, postage prepaid.

June *?, 19B1)

SR 8 (P-25)
Rev. 2-82

Date

Department Employee

IMPORTANT ~ SEE REVERSE SIDE
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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
745 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
(801)298-6153
September 18, 1990

Mr. Don R. Kynaston
512 North 750 East
Bountiful, Utah
84010
Re:

Case #902002886

DRIVING ON SUSPENSION
DRIVING ON BALD TIRES

Dear Mr. Kynaston:
Judge Johnson has entered an order that you report at the
Davis County Jail in Farmington, Utah at 5%00 p.m. on Friday
the 21st day of September to begin serving your 3 0 day jail
sentence. Please govern yourself accordingly.
Yours truly,
CIRCUIT COURT

JJ^U^Th^ *?[<
Court Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

This certifies that a true copy of the Appeal Brief has been delivered to
Russell Mahan by Certified Mail or in person.
DATED this

/ T ^ day of May, 1991.

DON R. KYNASTOJT

